

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposals for CIA Counterterrorism Initiatives

FROM:

C/IAD/

EXTENSION

January 17, 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/IAD

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CONTROL NO.

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SUSPENSE DATE

17/1/84

TO DDO via C/IAD

FROM C IAD

SUBJ. Proposal for CIA Counterterrorism Initiatives

Orig & 4

POINT OF FILING

ROUTING

DATE SENT

O-PD

17/1/84

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S E C R E T

17 JAN 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA: Chief, International Activities Division

FROM: [redacted] Chief
[redacted]
International Activities Division

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SUBJECT: Proposals for CIA Counterterrorism Initiatives

Background: The U.S. government's response to terrorism, random and/or state-supported, is one of the most hotly debated topics in town, and this is not likely to change in the near future. Nor can we hope that the incidence of terrorism will decline in 1984. Sand trucks at the White House, Presidential commissions and House committees finding fault, Community committees, DoD elements and NSC staff spawning ideas ranging from more studies through 'worldwide fusion centers' to anti-terrorist hit teams - all these signs indicate that the USG is scared, frustrated, and looking either for a solution to the problem or someone to blame. The Agency is and will continue to be under extreme pressure to come up with some answers, and some action.

I believe that we must find a way selectively to focus all of CIA's resources and skills on: (a) analyzing and taking action on threats and threat indicators, (b) managing, containing, and resolving if possible terrorist incidents as they occur and (c) responding to and professionally following to resolution incidents after they have occurred. We have some of this capability in place, some of it is being constructed right now, and some is still in the concept stage. It cannot be done on the cheap. We will need more people, additional funding, and allocation of scarce work space. I believe that the following proposals will increase our ability to protect U.S. personnel and interests around the world, show the Community and the Government that we are taking the most effective possible protective action, and incidentally help to deflect and re-channel some of the energy that has recently given rise to suggestions that are either inefficient, illegal, or potentially damaging to our continuing primary intelligence missions.

I. ACTION IN PROGRESS: At your direction we have created a [redacted] unit, [redacted]

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The C/NE has agreed that it will have detailed to it an experienced NE officer who will specifically monitor threats to the NE area of the world. It will also have at least one OGI terrorism specialist, [redacted]

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WARNING NOTICE
INTELIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

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and work next to the operations officers and area referents in [redacted] When the new section, under guidelines presently being constructed for your approval, senses that a terrorist threat to U.S. interests anywhere in the world is at a level where action should be taken, warning notices and specific action recommendations will be sent to field stations, and high-level interagency support will be coordinated in Washington. [redacted]

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PROPOSAL: This new unit needs an action arm, [redacted] that can be offered for immediate dispatch to stations that need assistance. [redacted]

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Do it
[redacted] The personnel are available and in most cases would be the same who would respond [redacted] What is needed is concept approval and authority [redacted] to task other Agency components for nominees for a trained and exercised 'ready reserve'. Contingency funding should be identified, so that travel can commence with no delay.

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II. ACTION IN PROGRESS: [redacted] has been successfully deployed [redacted] and is, at least on paper, ready to go again. Its primary utility is as an augmentation of the affected Station's intelligence collection capabilities during a terrorist incident, typically a hostage/barricade situation. It may be that, like Delta, [redacted] is waiting for the sort of crisis that is not likely to occur again. But it still has utility, and is a concept flexible enough to adapt to new uses as proposed above and below. It needs to be exercised periodically, so that the [redacted] personnel get experience with each other and with the new equipment [redacted]

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Do it
PROPOSAL: [redacted] should be exercised at least twice yearly. This will be a drain on personnel and financial resources. Present resources may require supplementing; top management approval in principle for the time and expense is necessary and must be forcefully communicated to subordinate Agency elements.

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III. NEW CONCEPT: As the wave of the future seems to be bombing attacks and random assassinations, there is a need for a [redacted] which can be dispatched immediately

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PROPOSAL: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] be approved in concept
and funding be identified. [REDACTED] would suggest that
such a team be assembled on an ad hoc basis for
individual situations [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The essential thing in such a concept
is that it be very flexible, able to provide meaning-
ful response to incidents of all types, with a mech-
anism in being that can assemble the proper team rep-
idly from a pool of capable officers. Along those
lines, we believe that such a team badly
needs access to skills not readily available in
CIA, that of experienced, trained criminal investi-
gators. A terrorist act is by definition a
criminal one - not necessarily susceptible to
resolution by FI-trained officers and techs. We
should actively recruit and integrate into our
counterterrorist operations some experienced,
capable, street-smart criminal investigators. (A
possible source for these and other needed personnel
is addressed in proposal below.)

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IV. PERSONNEL: We recognize the difficulty of finding
personnel with the requisite skills and experience, and of moving
slots around in a constrained environment. But counterterrorism
is a top priority subject and we simply must apply the necessary
resources to it or risk both criticism and (perhaps worse) the
proliferation of other government counterterrorism elements whose
activities could end up being counterproductive, inefficient
and/or dangerous.

PROPOSAL: [REDACTED] be authorized enough extra
slots [REDACTED] to handle the present level
of responsibilities and the projected increases.
As to the need for specialized skills not
necessarily available in CIA's manpower pool,
we suggest a tack that may be both effective and
politic - that is, detailees from the military,
FBI and State, with demonstrable expertise in
criminal and forensic investigation. These officers

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would be [redacted] 25X1
 polygraphed and cleared for SCI and Agency information on a need-to-know basis. If we got the right people, this would do two things; give us the required skills and demonstrate to the Community that CIA was leading an integrated response to a serious problem that affects us all. [redacted] Because counterterrorism requires in the first instance an intelligence response, intimately involved with sources and methods and sensitive liaison relationships. And when we have enough intelligence to thwart a terrorist-operation, or to wrap up a network, it is CIA's relationships with foreign liaison and police services that will be needed. 25X1

If these slots are approved, and it is agreed that other Community elements can and should contribute manpower, it is very important that the request, or tasking, come from a level high enough to guarantee respectful attention and the assignment of extremely competent officers. We would suggest a DCI initiative at the NFIB level.

Also, any mention of additional personnel must take into account the need for work spaces. Expansion [redacted] responsibilities should be considered in the context of the DDO/DDI co-location problem, with high managerial priority. 25X1

V EXPANSION OF LIAISON COOPERATION: As mentioned above, liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and internal security services are our best hope for prior warning of and effective action against international terrorists. These relationships are extremely important, and it is necessary that we devote considerable effort to nurturing them. We need to convince the senior officers of the services with which we deal that the USG is deadly serious about the terrorist threat and committed at the highest level to dealing with it, with their help. Continuity of experience in dealing with liaison, linguistic ability, mobility, and substantive background in counterterrorist operations are qualities that we should develop in the Directorate.

yes
 PROPOSAL: That we give high priority to CT liaison, to include reciprocal visits by senior officials; that we attempt to get foreign CT heavies in to see the DCI or DDCI when they visit Headquarters.

We should continue and expand on the 'circuit riding' visits [redacted] to overseas stations. 25X1
 Consideration should be given to the establishment of one or more PCS positions in Europe and the Near East for counterterrorism specialists, who would work with liaison at their post and in nearby countries on a regular basis. (This concept, and the ability to rotate officers

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between Headquarters and the field, would make [redacted]
positions more attractive to the strong case officers we
need.)

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